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Emotion: Social Explanations as a 
Foundation of Prejudice-Related 
Compunction
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Two studies examined whether social explanations—causal frameworks used to make sense of a 
group’s status and behavior—are associated with prejudice-related compunction. In Study 1, 
based on Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliott, (1991), participants who endorsed external 
explanations (e.g. low socioeconomic status of Blacks stems from historical maltreatment) 
showed a particularly strong tendency to experience compunction in response to prejudice-
related discrepancies. Study 2 involved a novel paradigm. Participants were induced to 
admit that they would discriminate against Black males. Conceptually replicating Study 1, 
endorsement of external explanations was positively associated with compunction in response 
to this imagined discrimination. Across both studies, there was also evidence that the effects 
of external explanations are not explicable in terms of internal motivation to avoid prejudice, 
global prejudice, or global positive evaluation of African Americans. Discussion centers on 
the importance of explanations in shaping intergroup emotions and how the concept of 
explanation links the intergroup emotion literature to other emotion literatures. 
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Social psychologists have long sought to 
understand the nature of prejudice and the keys 
to its reduction (see Oskamp, 2000). Recently, 
researchers have focused their attention on 
Allport’s (1954) notion of prejudice with com-
punction as integral to prejudice reduction 
efforts. The idea is that if people experience 
compunction—negative, self-directed emotions 
(e.g. guilt, anger at self)—following a prejudicial 
response, this initiates a self-regulatory cycle that 
fosters prejudice reduction in both the short- and 
long-term (e.g. Devine et al., 1991; Monteith, 
1993). Following from this, some researchers 
have attempted to pinpoint belief systems that 
predispose people to the experience of prejudice-
related compunction (e.g. Plant & Devine, 1998). 
The present work continues in this tradition 
by examining whether social explanations—the 
causal frameworks people employ to understand 
group status and action—are associated with the 
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degree of compunction experienced following 
a prejudicial response. 
Prejudice with or without 
compunction
Devine (1989) made the seminal argument that 
prejudicial responses can be spontaneously 
triggered upon encountering members of stereo-
typed groups. More surprisingly, she argued, this 
can occur even among people who desire to be 
unbiased. Those who desire to be unbiased must 
engage in effortful mental activity to inhibit 
biased responses and replace them with unbiased 
responses. This conceptual framework—in-
volving ideas of spontaneous bias and effortful 
debiasing—has become highly infl uential (e.g. 
Bargh, 1999; Fiske, Lin, & Neuberg, 1999; but 
see Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; 
Lepore & Brown, 1997; Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, 
Wasel, & Schaal, 1999, for evidence that unbiased 
responses can be spontaneous). Importantly, this 
framework implies that people are not simply 
prejudiced or unprejudiced. Rather, many 
people are ambivalent (Katz & Hass, 1988) and 
characterized by prejudice-related discrepancies: 
prejudicial responses that exist alongside a sense 
that those responses are undesirable. 
Devine et al. (1991) explored people’s emo-
tional reactions to awareness of their prejudice-
related discrepancies. They found that many 
participants reported that they would respond 
to a member of a stereotyped group (African 
Americans in Study 1; homosexual men in Study 2) 
in more prejudiced ways than they believed 
they should. For example, many participants 
indicated that they would be uncomfortable if 
a Black person or gay male sat next to them on 
the bus, even though they believed that they 
should not experience such discomfort. Critically, 
participants had divergent emotional reactions 
when they were made aware of these prejudice-
related discrepancies: those low in prejudice 
toward the group experienced compunction, 
whereas those high in prejudice experienced 
only general discomfort. 
Monteith and her colleagues (1993; Monteith, 
Ashburn-Nardo, Voils, Czopp, 2002) went further 
to explore the notion that prejudice-related 
compunction motivates self-regulation of 
prejudice. For example, Monteith (1993)found 
that among those who experienced prejudice-
related compunction there were associated 
tendencies toward self-focus, thoughts con-
cerning one’s discrepancies, attention to 
discrepancy-relevant information, and, critically, 
long-term inhibition of prejudiced responses 
(e.g. subsequently heard gay-related jokes 
were evaluated less favorably). Furthermore, 
Monteith et al. (2002) presented evidence sug-
gesting that—among those low in prejudice 
toward African Americans—the perception of 
having been biased gave rise to compunction, 
behavioral inhibition, and refl ection (which are 
theoretically necessary for an effortful process of 
self-regulation), and more positive subsequent 
responses to African Americans. Taken together, 
these fi ndings suggest that the experience of 
compunction can trigger a self-regulatory cycle 
directed toward prejudice reduction. 
The psychological bases of prejudice-
related compunction
The literature thus reveals that people some-
times show biases that they simultaneously 
consider undesirable. Moreover, when such 
prejudice-related discrepancies occur, some 
individuals experience compunction. Finally, 
this compunction affects whether individuals 
will engage in self-regulatory processes tailored 
toward the reduction of their biases. It is also 
clear that, for some individuals, prejudicial re-
sponses do not foster compunction and thus 
are unlikely to energize debiasing efforts. If the 
experience of prejudice-related compunction is 
important for prejudice reduction, it is crucial to 
understand its underlying foundations. That is, 
why do some individuals experience prejudice-
related compunction whereas others do not?
Plant and Devine (1998) provided an illumin-
ating answer to this question: they examined 
the source of people’s motivation to respond 
in unbiased ways and suggested that this is a 
critical factor affecting emotional reactions to 
prejudice-related discrepancies. Specifi cally, 
they posited that individuals who are high in 
internal motivation to avoid bias will experience 
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compunction as a result of such discrepancies. 
Such individuals have anti-bias value systems that 
are central to their self concept (e.g. ‘being a 
good person requires me to shun prejudice’). 
Violating this deeply held value system results in 
feelings of compunction, as does the violation 
of any internalized ‘ought’ standard (Higgins, 
1987). In contrast, individuals high in external 
motivation to avoid bias will not experience com-
punction. For these individuals, eliminating bias 
is simply an attempt to conform to perceived 
societal standards (e.g. ‘people might not like me 
if they see that I am biased’), and has no deep 
basis in the individual’s value system. Hence, 
violating these standards does not foster com-
punction. Plant and Devine (1998) reported 
data supporting this framework: those high 
in internal motivation are especially likely to 
experience compunction when made aware of 
their prejudice-related discrepancies. 
Social explanations as a foundation 
of compunction
The intended contribution of the present 
article is to offer—and provide empirical sup-
port for—a different conceptual approach to 
understanding prejudice-related compunction. 
Our analysis is based on the concept of social 
explanations, which are the causal frameworks 
people rely on to make sense of societal patterns 
of group status and group action. Explanation 
is a fundamental and pervasive cognitive activity 
aiding the development of knowledge about 
the world that can provide a basis for action 
(e.g. Gopnik, 2000; Heider, 1958). We take the 
view of scholars such as Heider (1958), Gilbert 
(1998), Malle (2004), and Weiner (2006) that 
explanation lies at the heart of social cognition. 
Our focus, however, is at the intergroup level, 
rather than the interpersonal level generally 
favored by these other scholars. 
We start with the idea that people are motiv-
ated to explain salient facets of intergroup status 
and action (e.g. Why do African Americans 
predominate in so many decaying neighbor-
hoods?). Stereotypes and prejudice are one 
possible consequence of this explanatory 
drive: these arise when people generate internal 
explanations—explanations that focus on features 
ostensibly inherent in the group (e.g. African 
Americans are irresponsible)—to explain inter-
group patterns (see Allport, 1954; Hoffman & 
Hurst, 1990; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Sidanius & 
Pratto, 1999; Yzerbyt & Rocher, 2002). Despite 
receiving the bulk of attention in the inter-
group attitudes literature, it is clear that internal 
explanations are not the only framework of ex-
planation available to perceivers (see Gilbert, 
1998; Heider, 1958; Malle, 2004; Weiner, 1986). 
Indeed, researchers have found that educational 
experiences, particularly university-level study 
in the social sciences, tend to foster external 
explanations—explanations that focus on factors 
‘outside of’ a group (e.g. societal and economic 
forces)—as a determinant of intergroup patterns 
(Guimond, Begin, & Palmer, 1989; Lopez, Gurin, 
& Nagda, 1998).1 Although existing theory 
and research point strongly to the existence of 
internal and external explanatory frameworks 
within the realm of intergroup cognition, little 
evidence exists pertaining to the role of these 
frameworks in shaping intergroup emotion, 
cognition, and behavior more generally.2 
Our lab has recently begun to explore these 
relations. For example, Gill and Andreychik 
(2006) had participants provide open-ended social 
explanations regarding the low socioeconomic 
status (SES) of African Americans (Study 1), the 
violence of terrorists (Study 2), or the kindness 
and caretaking tendencies of women (Study 3). 
Participants showed a clear tendency to reason in 
terms of internal and external causes. Moreover, 
across these diverse target groups, external 
explanations were associated with more positive 
orientations toward a group than were internal 
explanations. Specifi cally, those who generated 
external explanations were more supportive 
of diversity policies that could benefi t African 
Americans (Study 1), more resistant to using 
violence to combat terrorism (Study 2), and 
had lower levels of hostile sexism (Study 3; see 
Glick & Fiske, 1996). Furthermore, Study 4 
provided evidence consistent with a causal role 
of social explanations. In that study, exposure 
to documentary footage highlighting external 
forces that have hindered African Americans 
reduced the internality of people’s explanations 
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 10(1)
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and this shift in explanations mediated a shift 
toward more favorable social policy stances. 
We expect that social explanations are rele-
vant to the experience of prejudice-related 
compunction. Why? Our reasoning is rooted 
in the concept of the justice motive (Lerner, 
1980; Ross & Miller, 2002). Indeed, there is a 
rich literature linking social explanations to 
justice concerns (see Hoffman & Hurst, 1990; 
Jost & Banaji, 1994; Lerner, 1980; Reyna, Henry, 
Korfmacher, & Tucker, 2005; Weiner, 2006; 
Yzerbyt, Rocher, & Schadron, 1997), although 
the studies below will examine facets of this link 
that have received little attention. The justice 
motive refers to the desire to view the world as 
just or fair, in the sense that the treatment ac-
corded to people is commensurate with their 
‘deservingness’. The justice motive reflects 
the desire to believe that ‘good things happen 
to good people’ and ‘bad people get punished’. 
Existing literature supports the notion that the 
justice motive is deeply ingrained in people’s value 
systems (Lerner, 1980; M. Ross & Miller, 2002), 
and thus behaving out of line with its dictates 
should foster compunction (Higgins, 1987). 
Critically, social explanations shape people’s 
reasoning about justice. This connection was 
initially made clear by Hoffman and Hurst 
(1990). They argued that, rather than forming 
stereotypes simply by observing the behavior of 
different groups, people construct stereotypes 
that make the social status quo (e.g. division 
of labor; social stratifi cation) seem fair. For 
Hoffman and Hurst, then, stereotypes function 
as internal social explanations: they refer to 
internal qualities of a group (e.g. kind, gentle) 
that offer a ready-made explanation for the 
group’s social status and action (e.g. ‘Of course 
they take care of the children—they are kind 
and gentle!’). Indeed, building on Hoffman and 
Hurst, numerous scholars have converged on 
a critical point: negative orientations toward a 
group can be seen as perfectly just if internal 
explanations are created that rationalize that 
negative orientation (e.g. Jost & Banaji, 1994; 
Reyna et al., 2005; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; 
Yzerbyt et al., 1997). In other words, employment 
discrimination is fair if a group is perceived as 
lazy, limited social roles are fair if a group is 
perceived as ‘naturally suited’ for such roles, 
and even hostility is fair if a group is perceived 
as having morally undesirable qualities. Because 
internal explanations justify negative orientations 
toward a group, we do not expect those who 
embrace internal explanations for the negative 
social status of African Americans to experience 
prejudice-related compunction. Such perceivers 
associate African Americans with a host of un-
desirable personal qualities, and thus will feel 
that negative thoughts and feelings toward 
African Americans are perfectly fair. 
What about those who embrace external ex-
planations? External explanations and their 
implications for intergroup orientations have 
received limited attention in the literature. We 
propose that external explanations dramatically 
shift people’s reasoning about justice, and 
hence shift the likelihood that people will 
experience compunction in response their 
own biases. To elaborate, individuals invoking 
external explanations focus on factors ‘outside 
of’ a group as giving rise to the status or action 
of the group. Because of this, the internal 
qualities of the group are of unknown—and 
perhaps high—desirability. Indeed, from within 
an external framework, the type of treatment 
or social position that a group ‘truly deserves’ 
cannot be inferred from the group’s current 
social status or action because these were deter-
mined by factors outside of the group per se. 
By analogy, just as one cannot know the skill 
of a drummer who is wearing handcuffs, one 
cannot know the characteristics and potentialities 
of a group that has been ‘handcuffed’ by dis-
criminatory social policies, fear of more powerful 
or more heavily armed groups, lack of economic 
opportunities, and so on. Therefore, from 
within this explanatory mindset, any negative 
behavior or thinking toward the group is a 
violation of the justice motive because such 
thought and behavior is incommensurate with 
the perceived deservingness of the group. In 
fact, negative thinking or behavior might even 
be viewed as ‘adding insult to injury’, given that 
the group is already seen as enduring unearned 
suffering. Because negative orientations toward 
a group are a violation of the justice motive for 
those embracing external social explanations, 
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we expect such individuals to experience 
compunction upon becoming aware of their 
biases toward a group. 
The present studies
The studies below were designed to investigate 
the relation between social explanations and 
prejudice-related compunction. To ensure 
comparability with past work, Study 1 will use 
materials from Devine et al. (1991). The key 
prediction is that among those who strongly 
embrace external explanations there will be a 
strong, positive association between prejudice-
related discrepancies and compunction. In 
contrast, we expect that the association between 
discrepancies and compunction will be weaker 
among those who weakly embrace external ex-
planations. The rationale for this prediction is 
derived from our arguments above: among those 
who strongly embrace external explanations, as 
their prejudice-related discrepancies increase in 
size (i.e. as they admit to greater and greater 
divergence between how they should versus 
would respond) they will perceive their biases as 
increasingly unjust and hence will experience 
compunction. In contrast, for those weakly em-
bracing external explanations, discrepancies will 
not be perceived as especially unjust and thus 
there will be a weaker tendency for discrepancies 
to foster compunction. 
Study 2 will utilize a novel paradigm to provide 
a conceptual replication of Study 1. Participants 
will fi rst be induced to admit that they would 
discriminate against Black males (by avoiding 
them in a ‘bad neighborhood’). Then, their 
reactions—including compunction—to this 
imagined act of discrimination will be measured. 
The key prediction is the same as for Study 1: 
external explanations will be associated with 
heightened compunction, and the reason is that 
bias seems more unjust to those who strongly 
embrace external explanations. One advantage 
of Study 2 is that we will include a direct measure 
of the perceived justice of one’s bias, thereby 
enabling a test of our idea that justice concerns 
mediate the link between external explanations 
and compunction. Study 2 will also examine 
another potential mediator: the extent to 
which bias is seen as ‘rational behavior’. Some 
scholars have suggested that bias need not elicit 
self-criticism because, for example, avoiding 
groups that are statistically associated with 
negative behavior is simply rational (e.g. D’Souza, 
1995). To test whether social explanations affect 
compunction by altering the perceived rationality 
of bias (e.g. perhaps endorsement of external 
explanations makes bias seems less rational, 
hence creating more compunction for having 
behaved ‘irrationally’), Study 2 will also include 
direct measures of the perceived rationality 
of one’s bias. We do not expect this measure 
to be as strong a mediator of the link between 
external explanations and compunction as are 
justice concerns. The reason is that we do not 
think that social explanations are particularly 
relevant to the perceived rationality of bias: 
for example, an act of discrimination can be 
seen as rational (e.g. it ‘makes sense’ to avoid a 
potentially dangerous encounter) regardless of 
one’s understanding of the causes necessitating 
that discrimination (e.g. those teenagers are 
‘evil’ vs. those teenagers had the misfortune 
of being born into a neighborhood fi lled with 
violence and neglect). 
Although the primary aim of the present article 
is to examine the relation of social explanations 
to prejudice-related compunction, we think it is 
important not to ignore existing work on the role 
of internal motivation in fostering compunction 
(Plant & Devine, 1998). So, in addition to our 
primary goal of providing support for the social 
explanations framework, we have a subordinate 
goal of examining whether social explanations 
and internal motivation are independent bases 
of prejudice-related compunction.
Study 1
Method
Overview Participants completed a pretest 
questionnaire gauging their endorsement 
of internal and external social explanations 
for African American socioeconomic status. 
Later in the semester, they returned for an 
ostensibly unrelated study during which they 
reported should and would judgments concerning 
encounters with African Americans as well as 
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 10(1)
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their emotional reactions to any discrepancies 
between their should and would judgments. 
The key prediction was that prejudice-related 
discrepancies would be more strongly linked 
to compunction among those strongly as 
compared to weakly endorsing external social 
explanations. 
Participants Participants who completed both 
the pretest and follow-up comprised 63 White 
female and 58 White male undergraduates at 
Lehigh University. All participants participated 
for course credit in their introductory psychology 
course.
Procedure
Pretest Altogether, 136 White Lehigh under-
graduates (67 female) attended pretest ses-
sions in groups of 2 to 20. After providing 
informed consent, they completed numerous 
questionnaires concerning their personalities 
and social attitudes. Of relevance to the current 
study, they completed the Social Explanations 
Questionnaire (SEQ; Gill & Andreychik, 2006; 
see Appendix A) and the Internal and External 
Motivations Scale (I & EMS; Plant & Devine, 
1998). For reasons that will become clear below, 
our fi nal sample included 99 participants (53 
female). All descriptive statistics below are based 
on that fi nal sample.
The SEQ comprised 18 items that gauged 
the extent to which the respondent endorsed 
particular causal frameworks for understanding 
African American socioeconomic status. Twelve 
of the items tapped internal explanations, i.e. 
explanations that focus on features ostensibly 
inherent in African Americans. Six of the items 
tapped external explanations, i.e. explanations 
that focus on factors in the environment or cir-
cumstances of African Americans. Participants 
rated each item on a 6-point scale ranging from 
Disagree strongly (1) to Agree strongly (6). Based 
on pilot research suggesting that internal and 
external items load on separate factors in a factor 
analysis, separate scores were calculated for each 
by averaging the 12 internal items (M = 2.01, 
SD = .81; α = .92) and the six external items 
(M = 4.10, SD = .95; α = .82). In the present 
sample, the correlation between internal and 
external explanations was modest (r(97) = –.25, 
p = .01).
The I&EMS (Plant & Devine, 1998) comprises 
five items measuring internal motivation 
(e.g. ‘I attempt to act in nonprejudiced ways 
toward Black people because it is personally 
important to me’) and fi ve items measuring 
external motivations (e.g. ‘Because of today’s 
PC—politically correct—standards I try to ap-
pear nonprejudiced toward Black people’). 
Participants responded to all 10 items using 
a scale with endpoints labeled Strongly disagree 
(1) and Strongly agree (9). Based on Plant and 
Devine’s scoring procedure, we averaged the fi ve 
internal motivation items to create an IMS score 
(M = 6.00, SD = 1.24; α = .90) and we averaged 
the fi ve external motivation items to create an 
EMS score (M = 5.05, SD = 1.20; α = .86).
Follow-up Participants who had completed the 
pretest were invited to participate in the follow-
up, which occurred approximately one month 
later. Altogether, 120 participants attended 
survey sessions in groups of 2 to 15 and were 
not informed of the relation between the pre-
test and the follow-up. Both the location and 
experimenter were different from the pretest. 
Upon arrival, they read a consent form describing 
a study of ‘attitudes on potentially controversial 
issues, including racial issues’. After signing the 
consent form, they were given a survey packet 
that contained the measures described below 
along with some fi ller questionnaires. 
Participants first reported their personal 
standards for how they should respond in fi ve 
situations involving Black people (see Devine 
et al., 1991). An example is: ‘Imagine that a 
Black person boarded a bus and sat next to 
you. You should feel uncomfortable that a Black 
person is sitting next to you’. For each situ-
ation, participants circled a number on a scale 
ranging from Strongly disagree (1) to Strongly 
agree (7). After appropriate reverse scoring such 
that higher scores indicated more prejudiced 
should ratings, a total should score was formed 
by averaging ratings across the fi ve situations 
(M = 1.77, SD = 1.06; α = .77).
After completing the should ratings, participants 
provided responses regarding how they would 
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actually respond in the same fi ve situations (e.g. 
‘Imagine that a Black person boarded a bus and 
sat next to you. You would feel uncomfortable 
that a Black person is sitting next to you’). For 
each situation, participants circled a number on 
a scale ranging from Strongly disagree (1) to Strongly 
agree (7). After appropriate reverse scoring such 
that higher scores indicated more prejudiced 
would ratings, a total would score was formed 
by averaging ratings across the fi ve situations 
(M = 2.32, SD = 1.28; α = .78).
A discrepancy index was calculated by sub-
tracting participants’ should ratings from their 
would ratings for each situation and then aver-
aging across the fi ve situations. This resulted 
in an index on which positive scores indicate 
that one’s predicted actual (would) responses 
are more prejudiced than her desired (should) 
responses. On this index, 42% of participants 
showed a positive discrepancy, 41% showed 
no discrepancy, and 17% showed a negative 
discrepancy. Following Devine et al. (1991) 
and Monteith et al. (1993), our analyses below 
involve only participants with zero or positive 
discrepancy scores (i.e. we excluded the 17% 
of participants who said they would behave less 
prejudicially than they should). This resulted in 
99 usable cases (M = .55, SD = .86; α = .75).
After completing should and would ratings, 
participants reported their feelings regarding 
any discrepancies between these ratings (e.g. how 
they felt about the fact that they would behave 
more prejudicially than they think they should). 
They indicated on a scale ranging from Does not 
apply at all (1) to Applies very much (7) the degree 
to which each of 35 affect terms described their 
feelings. The affect items were the same as those 
used in prior research (e.g. Devine et al., 1991; 
Monteith et al., 2002).
Following data collection, the affect items were 
combined as in Monteith et al. (2002). That is, 
we created indices of: compunction (angry at myself, 
guilty, annoyed with myself, regretful, disappointed 
with myself, disgusted with myself, shameful, self-
critical M = 2.28, SD = 1.60; α = .97); discomfort 
(fearful, uneasy, embarrassed, anxious, threatened, 
frustrated, bothered, uncomfortable, tense, M = 2.16, 
SD = 1.34; α = .94); other-directed negativity (angry 
at others, disgusted with others, irritated with others, 
M = 2.22, SD = 1.45; α = .85); and positive emotions 
(energetic, friendly, good, optimistic, happy; M = 3.38, 
SD = 1.44; α = .80). The indexes of other-directed 
negative emotions and positive emotions yielded 
nothing of theoretical interest. That is, each 
was predicted only by discrepancies (i.e. larger 
discrepancies produced more other-directed 
negative emotion and less positive emotion). 
Thus, those indexes will not be discussed 
further. 
Results
Our primary interest was in predicting people’s 
emotional reactions—especially compunction—
to their prejudice-related discrepancies. To test 
our hypotheses, we used multiple regression 
analysis and, in all cases, centered variables on 
their means before multiplying them to create 
interaction terms (Cohen & Cohen, 1983).
We fi rst regressed compunction on discrepancies, 
external explanations, internal explanations, 
IMS, EMS, and the interactions of these latter 
four variables with discrepancies.3 This analysis 
revealed just two signifi cant effects. First, there 
was a main effect of discrepancies, (t(85) = 4.27, 
p = .00005; β = .44), such that compunction 
increased as the size of discrepancies increased. 
This main effect is found in virtually all studies 
using the should–would measures and suggests 
that, in general, people experience compunction 
when they imagine that they would behave more 
negatively than they should. The critical question 
for us was whether the strength of the relation 
between discrepancies and compunction was 
moderated by external explanations, such that 
those embracing external explanations show 
a particularly strong tendency to experience 
compunction. Indeed, as predicted, there was an 
interaction between external explanations and 
discrepancies, (t(85) = 2.70, p = .008; β = .26). 
To explore the nature of this interaction, we 
conducted simple slope analyses (Aiken & 
West, 1991) using the ModGraph program ( Jose, 
2002). These examined the relation between 
discrepancies and compunction at varying levels 
of endorsement of external explanations. As can 
be seen in Figure 1, these analyses revealed the 
predicted pattern: discrepancies were strongly 
associated with compunction among those 
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who strongly or moderately endorsed external 
explanations (both ts(95) > 4.98, ps < .000003). 
In contrast, discrepancies were only marginally 
associated with compunction among those 
who weakly endorsed external explanations 
(t(95) = 1.82, p = .07). The interaction between 
IMS and discrepancies in this analysis was weak 
(t(85) = 1.48, p = .14; β = .23). Before drawing any 
conclusions about the effects of IMS, however, 
we must present some further analyses. Finally, 
the interactions of discrepancies with both 
internal explanations and external motivation 
were negligible (ts < 1). 
Next, we regressed discomfort on discrepancies, 
external explanations, internal explanations, 
IMS, EMS, and the interactions of these latter 
four variables with discrepancies. This analysis 
revealed one signifi cant and one marginal effect. 
First, as with compunction, there was a main 
effect of discrepancies (t(85) = 3.80, p = .0003; 
β = .42), such that discomfort increased as the 
size of discrepancies increased. Second, as 
with compunction, there was an interaction 
between external explanations and discrepancies 
(t(85) = 1.95, p = .055; β = .20). This interaction, 
however, disappeared (t < 1) when compunction 
was added as an additional predictor in the 
multiple regression model. This supports 
the possibility that external explanations are 
not relevant to discomfort per se, but rather 
moderate the relation between discrepancies 
and discomfort only because discomfort shares 
some association with compunction. 
But, are external explanations relevant to 
compunction per se? That is, do external 
explanations create a specific tendency for 
discrepancies to foster compunction above 
and beyond any association that compunction 
shares with discomfort? To examine this issue, 
we repeated the regression analysis in which 
compunction was regressed on discrepancies, 
external explanations, internal explanations, 
IMS, EMS, and the interactions of these latter 
four variables with discrepancies. In this follow-up 
analysis, however, we added discomfort as another 
predictor. Critically, even with discomfort added 
to the model the interaction between external 
explanations and discrepancies remained 
signifi cant (t(84) = 2.04, p = .04), suggesting that 
external explanations are specifi cally relevant 
to the tendency for discrepancies to foster com-
punction above and beyond any association that 
compunction shares with discomfort. 
Interestingly, in the preceding analysis control-
ling for discomfort, the interaction between 
discrepancies and IMS—as found by Plant and 
Figure 1. Simple slope analysis revealing that the relation between discrepancies and compunction is 
moderated by endorsement of external social explanations. As per Aiken and West (1991), high level of 
endorsement is 1SD above the mean, medium is the mean, and low is 1SD below the mean.
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Devine (1998)—became statistically signifi cant. 
To examine the nature of this interaction, we 
fi rst computed residual compunction scores 
after controlling for discomfort, external ex-
planations, internal explanations, EMS, and 
the interactions of these latter three variables 
with discrepancies.4 Then, following Aiken and 
West (1991), we conducted simple slope analyses 
examining the relation between discrepancies 
and residual compunction at varying levels of 
IMS (using the Modgraph program; Jose, 2002). 
These analyses revealed a pattern similar to that 
uncovered by Plant and Devine: discrepancies 
were strongly and positively associated with 
residual compunction among those high 
(i.e. + 1SD from the mean) or medium (i.e. 
at the mean) in IMS (both βs > .24, ps < .05), 
but unrelated to residual compunction among 
those low (i.e. –1SD from the mean) in IMS 
(t < 1). Because this interaction of IMS with 
discrepancies was significant in a multiple 
regression that also included the interaction 
of external explanations and discrepancies, 
these data support the possibility that social 
explanations and IMS are independent bases 
of prejudice-related compunction. 
This recognition raises an important issue: 
do social explanations predict compunction 
above and beyond what can be predicted from 
variables previously explored in the literature? 
That is, does the social explanations concept 
add anything new to our understanding? The 
preceding paragraph suggests an affi rmative 
answer to this question, at least with respect to 
IMS. In addition to IMS, though, prior work 
(Devine et al., 1991; Monteith, 1993) has also 
linked global prejudice to compunction, with 
those low in global prejudice experiencing 
more compunction in response to discrepancies 
than those high in global prejudice. Do social 
explanations predict compunction above and 
beyond what can be predicted from global 
prejudice? Unfortunately, we did not administer 
any well-known measures of global prejudice. 
Yet, it is worth noting that IMS is strongly 
linked to such measures, showing very strong 
correlations (r = .66) with Brigham’s Attitudes 
toward Blacks Scale (Devine, Plant, Amodio, 
Harmon-Jones, & Vance, 2002). Thus, our 
fi ndings regarding IMS indirectly suggest that 
social explanations might have effects inde-
pendent of global prejudice levels. Of even 
greater relevance, our measure of internal 
explanations seems quite similar to traditional 
measures of prejudice, as it includes items con-
cerning belief in inherent inferiority of African 
Americans, association of African Americans with 
negative traits, and so on. Thus, the fact that 
the interaction between external explanations 
and discrepancies was signifi cant even when 
internal explanations and their interaction 
with discrepancies were statistically controlled 
strongly supports the notion that the effects 
of external explanations are not explicable in 
terms of global prejudice levels. 
Discussion
Study 1 supported our expectation that social 
explanations are associated with the experi-
ence of prejudice-related compunction. More 
specifically, as predicted, the tendency to 
experience compunction in response to 
prejudice-related discrepancies was quite 
pronounced among people who strongly 
embraced external explanations for African 
American socioeconomic patterns, but weaker 
among those who weakly embraced external 
explanations. Furthermore, external explanations 
were specifi cally relevant to compunction. That 
is, they were associated with compunction in 
response to discrepancies even when discomfort 
was statistically controlled, and not associated 
with discomfort in response to discrepancies when 
compunction was statistically controlled. In 
addition, Study 1 also suggested that social 
explanations provide novel information about 
the basis of prejudice-related compunction. That 
is, the moderating effect of external explanations 
on the relation between discrepancies and 
compunction remained evident even after 
statistically controlling for effects involving 
IMS and global prejudice (as measured by our 
internal explanations scale). 
We must also acknowledge limitations of 
Study 1. In particular, the should and would 
judgments involve hypothetical scenarios. 
Thus, it is possible that people’s responses 
to them are not relevant to reactions to 
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real-world interracial encounters. For example, 
whereas some people reported compunction 
in response to imagining discomfort in the 
presence of a Black person, those people might 
not actually experience compunction if such 
discomfort actually occurred. If this were true, 
one reason might be that people engage in 
stronger self-justifi cation efforts when it comes 
to their actual behavior (i.e. they might strive 
harder to convince themselves they are a good 
person by justifying their biases). On the other 
hand, though, it is also plausible that the use of 
hypothetical scenarios underestimates the extent 
to which people experience compunction. That 
is, whereas one might feel a little compunc-
tion upon imagining discomfort in the presence 
of a Black person, one might feel a lot of 
compunction upon experiencing discomfort 
in the presence of a fl esh-and-blood fellow 
human being (i.e. ‘How could I treat a person 
in this way!?’). Finally, it is worth nothing that 
Monteith and her colleagues (1993; Monteith 
et al., 2002) have studied prejudice-related 
compunction and self-regulation using somewhat 
more realistic scenarios and found results that 
closely parallel those based on the hypothetical 
should/would paradigm. They have also pro-
vided substantial evidence for the validity of 
the type of discrepancy measure used in Study 1 
(Monteith & Voils, 1998).
Study 2
Study 2 will use a novel set of research mater-
ials to examine the phenomenon of prejudice-
related compunction. The approach will involve 
inducing participants to admit that they would 
discriminate under certain conditions and then 
having them report how they would feel about 
this act of discrimination. Specifi cally, we cre-
ated a vignette in which one’s nonprejudiced 
standards would confl ict with one’s standards 
based on personal safety: Participants were asked 
whether they would avoid Black male teenagers 
in a ‘bad neighborhood’. We expected that 
most participants would make a decision based 
on personal safety concerns, but that some of 
these participants would nevertheless experience 
compunction regarding their decision. As above, 
our prediction was that those strongly embracing 
external explanations would be most likely to 
experience prejudice-related compunction. 
Furthermore, as mentioned above, Study 2 
will also examine mediators of the effect of 
social explanations on compunction. Above, 
we argued that social explanations modify the 
extent to which bias is perceived as just or fair, 
and that compunction grows out of perceptions 
of (in)justice. Therefore, in Study 2, we will 
include a direct measure of beliefs about the 
justness/fairness of one’s discriminatory action. 
In addition, as described above, Study 2 will 
also include a measure of perceptions of the 
rationality of one’s discriminatory action. This 
will enable a test of whether social explanations 
infl uence compunction because they modify 
the extent to which prejudice is seen as rational 
behavior. Whereas we have a strong prediction 
that justice/fairness perceptions will mediate the 
effect of social explanations on compunction, 
our predictions regarding rationality perceptions 
are less certain (see above). 
Method 
Overview During a pretest, participants com-
pleted the same measures of social explanations 
and internal and external motivations as in 
Study 1. Weeks later, participants completed a 
measure asking whether they would discriminate 
by avoiding a group of Black teenagers in a ‘bad 
neighborhood’. Among those who answered 
‘yes’, items tapping compunction, emotional 
distress, belief in the justice/fairness of their 
action, and belief in the rationality of their action 
were presented. The key predictions were that 
external explanations would be linked to the 
experience of prejudice-related compunction 
(as in Study 1) and furthermore that beliefs 
about the fairness of one’s discriminatory action 
would mediate this link. 
Participants Sixty-two White female and 58 
White male undergraduates at Lehigh University 
participated for credit in their introductory 
psychology course.
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Procedure 
Pretest At the beginning of the semester, par-
ticipants took part in a pretest. After signing a 
consent form indicating that they would complete 
some potentially controversial measures of 
racial attitudes, they completed the SEQ. As in 
Study 1, each participant received an external 
explanations score (M = 4.09; SD = 1.02; α = .83) 
and an internal explanations score (M = 2.06, 
SD = .85; α = .90). The correlation between these 
scores in the present sample was (r(118) = –.29, 
p = .002). Participants also completed Plant and 
Devine’s (1998) I&EMS. As in Study 1, separate 
scores were computed for IMS (M = 6.83, SD = 
1.81; α = .90) and EMS (M = 5.12, SD = 1.96; 
α = .86).
Follow-up A few weeks after the pretest, par-
ticipants were asked to participate in the 
follow-up phase of the study. Participants 
were not made aware of the relation between 
the two phases, and each phase had a different 
experimenter and took place at a different 
location. During the follow-up, after completing 
a Consent Form indicating that the study would 
concern potentially controversial racial attitudes, 
participants completed a measure asking whether 
they might try to avoid Black male teenagers in 
a bad neighborhood (see Appendix B). Fully 
89.2% of participants (N = 107) indicated that 
they would.5 
Crucially, the measure also solicited—from 
the 107 participants who said they might prac-
tice avoidance—the respondent’s reaction to 
his or her imagined avoidance (see, again, 
Appendix B). Ratings on each item were made 
on a scale ranging from Feel this not at all (1) 
to Feel this strongly (6). Because prior work has 
distinguished between compunction and other 
types of negative emotions, we included two items 
tapping compunction and three items tapping 
emotional distress other than compunction. 
Furthermore, to test our hypotheses regard-
ing potential mediators, we included one 
item concerning perceptions of the justice of 
one’s discriminatory behavior and a few items 
concerning the extent to which one thinks 
one’s discriminatory behavior is rational. After 
appropriate reverse scoring, we combined the 
items shown in Appendix B to form indexes 
of compunction (M = 3.43, SD = 1.48; α = .72), 
emotional distress other than compunction 
(M = 3.42, SD = 1.20; α = .69), belief in the 
justice of one’s discriminatory act (M = 2.75, 
SD = 1.49), and belief in the rationality of 
one’s discriminatory act (M = 4.40, SD = 0.98; 
α = .77). 
Results
Our primary interest was in predicting who ex-
perienced compunction in response to their 
imagined act of discrimination. We examined this 
among the 107 participants who had answered 
that they might engage in such discrimination. 
In addition, we aimed to test two hypotheses 
regarding mediation: (a) social explanations 
infl uence compunction because they affect the 
extent to which negative reactions to a group 
are perceived as fair and just; and (b) social 
explanations infl uence compunction because 
they affect the extent to which discrimination 
is viewed as rational behavior. 
Our primary analysis involved regressing the 
compunction index on external explanations, 
internal explanations, IMS, and EMS. This 
revealed a significant effect of external ex-
planations (t(102) = 3.17, p = .002; β = .32), 
the direction of which suggested that those 
who strongly embraced external explanations 
reported stronger feelings of compunction 
than did those who weakly embraced external 
explanations. The effect of IMS was in the 
expected direction, but weak (t(102) = 1.46, 
p = .147; β = .18). The effects of internal 
explanations and EMS were negligible (both 
ts < 1.27, ps > .20). Notably, this tendency for 
external explanations to be particularly potent 
for predicting compunction replicates the 
pattern found in Study 1. 
Do the present data also confi rm the fi nd-
ing of Study 1 that external explanations are 
particularly relevant for compunction but not 
other forms of emotional distress? To examine 
this, we regressed compunction on external 
explanations, internal explanations, IMS, EMS, 
and emotional distress. The effect of emotional 
distress was highly signifi cant (t(101) = 7.11, 
p < .00001; β = .57), indicating a strong positive 
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association between compunction and other 
types of emotional distress. Yet, in this analysis 
the relation between external explanations and 
compunction remained signifi cant (t(101) = 2.07, 
p = .041). Furthermore, we found that when 
emotional distress was regressed on external 
explanations, internal explanations, IMS, and 
EMS, the only signifi cant effect was that of 
external explanations (t(102) = 2.47, p = .015; 
β = .25). Yet, when we added compunction as 
a predictor in this regression model, the effect 
of external explanations on emotional distress 
disappeared (t < 1). Taken together, these an-
alyses are congruent with the fi ndings of Study 1 
in suggesting that external explanations are 
specifi cally relevant to compunction and not 
to other types of emotional distress. 
Next, we turned our attention to potential 
mediators: justice concerns and perceptions of 
rationality. To test mediation, we followed the 
procedures outlined by Baron and Kenny (1986). 
As can be seen in Table 1, there were signifi cant 
zero-order relations between external explanations 
and compunction and between external 
explanations and both potential mediators 
(i.e. external explanations were associated with 
heightened justice concerns and diminished 
perceptions of rationality). Thus, mediation is 
a possibility for both potential mediators. To 
directly test mediation, we computed multiple 
regression analyses that enabled us to see the 
extent to which the beta weight representing 
the effect of external explanations on com-
punction was reduced when each mediator 
was separately added to the regression model. 
As can be seen in the top part of Table 1, the 
beta weight representing the effect of external 
explanations was reduced by approximately 
50% when justice concerns were added as a 
predictor in the multiple regression model. This 
indicated signifi cant mediation, as confi rmed by 
a Sobel test (see Table 1). In addition, as can be 
seen in the lower part of Table 1, in a separate 
multiple regression analysis, the beta weight 
representing the effect of external explanations 
was reduced by approximately 20% when belief 
in the rationality of one’s discrimination was 
added as a predictor in the multiple regres-
sion model. This represented a marginal 
mediation effect, as suggested by a Sobel test 
Table 1. Regression analyses testing mediating roles of justice concerns and perceptions of the rationality of 
discrimination (Study 2)
Outcome variable Predictor variable β t p
Justice concerns as mediator
Eq. 1: Compunction External explanations .38 4.16 .0001
Eq. 2: Justice concerns External explanations .29 3.09 .003
Eq. 3: Compunction  External explanations .20 2.72 .008
 Justice concerns .61 8.23 < .0001
Statistical signifi cance of mediation
 Drop in external explanations beta .18 
 Sobel test  2.91, p = .004 
Perceptions of rationality as mediator
Eq. 1: Compunction External explanations .38 4.16 .0001
Eq. 2: Perceptions of  External explanations –.21 –2.23 .03
     rationality
Eq. 3: Compunction External explanations .30 3.51 .001
 Perceptions of rationality –.34 –3.91 .0002
Test of mediation
 Drop in external explanations beta .11
 Sobel test  1.90, p = .06
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(see Table 1). Thus, consistent with our expect-
ations, the strongest evidence regarding medi-
ation is that external explanations seem to foster 
compunction because they heighten concerns 
about the fairness of biases.6 
Finally, as in Study 1, we examined whether 
social explanations predict compunction above 
and beyond what can be predicted from variables 
previously explored in the literature. Data from 
Study 2 have already suggested that external 
explanations predict compunction above and 
beyond what can be predicted from IMS. What 
about global prejudice? In Study 2, our pretest 
included a measure of positive attitudes toward 
African American culture (created by the au-
thors).7 This is perhaps better thought of as a 
measure of positive global attitudes than as a 
measure of global prejudice (assuming that 
positive and negative attitudes are not simply 
the inverse of each other; see Katz & Hass, 1988). 
As might be expected, this measure showed a 
positive zero-order correlation with compunction 
(r(105) = .19, p = .05), suggesting that those who 
have positive attitudes toward African American 
culture experience more compunction in 
response to imagined discrimination. Import-
antly, however, when we regressed compunction 
on positive attitudes toward African American 
culture, external explanations, internal explan-
ations, IMS, and EMS, the effect of external 
explanations remained signifi cant (t(101) = 3.30, 
p = .001). Replicating Study 1, this suggests that 
social explanations provide novel information 
about the foundations of prejudice-related 
compunction. The effect of positive attitudes 
toward African American culture, however, be-
came nonsignifi cant (t < 1) in this analysis. 
Discussion
Study 2 looked at prejudice-related compunction 
using a novel paradigm. The fi ndings were 
remarkably consistent with Study 1 and, in 
addition, added important new information 
about mediation. Participants were asked 
whether they would engage in discriminatory 
behavior with respect to young Black males 
in a ‘bad neighborhood’. Almost 90% of re-
spondents said that they would. We examined 
people’s emotional and cognitive reactions to 
this imagined discrimination. Conceptually 
replicating Study 1, Study 2 revealed that those 
who strongly embrace external explanations 
experience more compunction in response to 
their biases than do those who weakly endorse 
external explanations. Also, just as in Study 1, 
external explanations were specifi cally relevant 
to compunction and not to other types of 
emotional distress. Critically, Study 2 also pro-
vided mediational evidence consistent with our 
argument in the Introduction. That is, there was 
a signifi cant mediational effect consistent with 
the notion that external explanations foster 
compunction because they increase the extent 
to which negative orientations toward a group 
seem unjust or unfair. Furthermore, we found 
weaker mediational evidence consistent with the 
notion that external explanations foster com-
punction because they decrease the extent to 
which negative orientations seem rational. 
Finally, Study 2 also provided evidence that 
the effects of external explanations on com-
punction are independent of IMS, but the 
evidence was more equivocal than in Study 1. 
In particular, the effect of external explanations 
was signifi cant when IMS was included in the 
multiple regression model, but the effect of IMS 
was weak. Given that the relevance of IMS to 
compunction has been demonstrated in several 
studies (our Study 1; Plant & Devine, 1998), it is 
probably reasonable to attribute this weak result 
to sampling error. Finally, Study 2 also provided 
evidence that external explanations have effects 
above and beyond the effects of global positive 
evaluations of African Americans. That is, 
despite the fact that positive attitudes toward 
African American culture showed a signifi cant 
zero-order correlation with compunction, the 
effect of external explanations on compunction 
remained signifi cant even when positive attitudes 
toward African American culture were included 
in the multiple regression model. 
General discussion
The literature suggests that many people 
hold ambivalent intergroup attitudes, show-
ing prejudicial responses that they simultan-
eously consider unacceptable (e.g. Allport, 1954; 
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Devine et al., 1991; Monteith, 1993; Monteith 
et al., 2002). The literature also suggests that 
those who experience compunction in response 
to their undesired biases are particularly likely to 
subsequently engage in self-regulatory strategies 
that will reduce their biases in both the short- 
and long-term (e.g. Monteith, 1993; Monteith 
et al., 2002). Because of the importance of com-
punction in energizing these positive forms of 
self-regulation, it is crucial to understand the 
psychological foundations of prejudice-related 
compunction. 
We sought to apply a social explanations frame-
work to this issue. The social explanations frame-
work centers on the idea that perceivers seek 
to explain group-based patterns in society (Why 
are some groups poor? Why are some groups 
violent?), and that the particular explanatory 
frameworks they create or embrace have impli-
cations for their subsequent orientation toward 
a group. In the present article we have focused 
on external explanations, which locate the cause 
of a group’s outcomes or actions “outside of” 
the group members and which imply that any 
group exposed to similar external causal forces 
would show similar outcomes or actions (see 
Gilbert, 1998; L. Ross, 1977). 
In particular, we hypothesized that those who 
embrace external explanations regarding the 
negative status and action of a group will be 
more likely to experience prejudice-related 
compunction. We reached this hypothesis 
through a consideration of work on the justice 
motive (Lerner, 1980; M. Ross & Miller, 2002). 
We reasoned that one who believes that a low 
status group has been ‘pushed around’ or ‘held 
down’ by external forces will feel compunction 
if she shows signs of a negative orientation (i.e. 
a prejudicial thought, feeling, or behavior) 
toward that group. The reason is that, from 
her perspective, the negative orientation is 
unjust because it involves bias toward a group 
whose negative status or action was substantially 
molded by forces outside of the group. Hence, 
the group does not clearly deserve to be on the 
receiving end of negative thoughts, feelings, or 
behaviors. 
Our predictions regarding the relation between 
external explanations and prejudice-related 
compunction were supported in both Study 1 
(using Devine et al.’s should–would paradigm) 
and Study 2 (using a novel paradigm that in-
volved imagining one’s self discriminating against 
Black males). That is, compared to those who 
weakly embrace external explanations, those 
who strongly embrace external explanations for 
African American socioeconomic patterns were 
particularly likely to experience compunction 
in response to prejudice-related discrepancies 
involving African Americans (Study 1) and in 
response to imagining themselves discriminating 
against Black males (Study 2). In addition, the 
data suggested that external explanations are 
specifi cally relevant to compunction and do 
not show a specifi c tendency to foster other 
types of negative emotions. Finally, the data from 
Study 2 were also consistent with our proposed 
mediational model: external explanations foster 
compunction because such explanations increase 
concerns about the justice of having a negative 
orientation toward a group. 
These fi ndings contribute to the literature con-
cerning bases of prejudice-related compunction. 
As noted above, both global prejudice (Devine et 
al., 1991) and IMS (Plant and Devine, 1998) have 
been linked to prejudice-related compunction. 
Importantly, our data suggested that the effects 
of external explanations are not explicable in 
terms of these other constructs. Indeed, the 
effect of external explanations on compunction 
remained statistically significant even after 
we statistically controlled for internal explan-
ations (which we interpret as an indicator of 
global prejudice; Studies 1 & 2), the interaction 
of internal explanations with discrepancies 
(Study 1), IMS (Studies 1 & 2), and global posi-
tive evaluations of African Americans (Study 2). 
Notably, we also found evidence that the effects 
of social explanations and IMS are somewhat 
independent. That is, both predictors were re-
lated to compunction in regression models that 
controlled for the effect of the other predictor 
(although the effects of social explanations were 
somewhat more robust). How can we understand, 
at a conceptual level, this independence between 
social explanations and IMS? One possibility 
is that, as proposed above, social explanations 
relate to thinking about social justice: what kind 
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of society have we created and how must we act 
to make it the kind of society we want it to be? 
In contrast, IMS might have more to do with a 
personal emphasis on being a kind person. This 
possibility is suggested by Plant and Devine’s 
(1998) data, which showed a strong correl-
ation between IMS and humanitarian values. 
Future research, of course, is necessary to test 
these speculations (although Study 2 did provide 
evidence that social explanations are relevant 
to justice concerns). 
Other work from our lab is also relevant to 
the issue of the divergent validity of social ex-
planations vis-a-vis other facets of intergroup 
attitudes. Of greatest relevance, Gill and 
Andreychik (2006; Study 1) found that social 
explanations regarding African Americans were 
signifi cantly associated with attitudes toward 
social policies implicating African Americans 
even after controlling for the effects of trait 
stereotypes, feeling thermometer ratings, 
Modern Racism (McConahay, 1986), Social 
Dominance Orientation (Sidanius & Pratto, 
1999), and Right-Wing Authoritarianism 
(Altemeyer, 1998). Taken together with the 
present studies, this work strongly suggests that 
the social explanations framework is not merely 
redundant with existing conceptual approaches 
to intergroup attitudes. 
Our fi ndings in the present article underline 
the crucial role of external explanations. This 
is important because, with few exceptions (e.g. 
Guimond et al., 1989; Lopez et al., 1998), we 
fi nd that little attention has been paid to such 
explanations in the intergroup attitudes liter-
ature. Indeed, even the work that has been done 
focuses on the existence of external explanations 
(see Guimond et al., 1989; Lopez et al., 1998) 
rather than on how such explanations might 
shape other aspects of intergroup cognition, 
emotion, and behavior. In contrast, internal 
explanations have received the lion’s share of 
attention. This becomes more evident when one 
considers that ubiquitously studied stereotypes 
are often a type of internal explanation (e.g. 
the stereotype of African American ‘laziness’ 
is an internal explanation for the low social 
position of African Americans; Allport, 1954; 
Jost & Banaji, 1994). We must add the caveat 
here that our data do not, of course, uniquely 
support a causal role of external explanations 
because our data are correlational in nature. As 
discussed in the introduction, however, other 
work from our lab (Gill & Andreychik, 2006; 
Study 4) comes closer to providing evidence 
for such a causal role. 
Finally, we think it is signifi cant to note how 
the social explanations framework builds a 
bridge between work on intergroup emotion 
and work on emotion in other domains. Diverse 
areas of study are unifi ed by the notion that the 
psychological process of explanation is a foundation 
of emotional experience. Weiner (1986, 2006) has 
been particularly prolifi c in linking explanation 
to emotion. For example, he has highlighted 
how explanations impact self-directed emotions 
(e.g. self-esteem), other-directed emotions (e.g. 
anger, gratitude), and emotions triggered by 
outcomes (e.g. a given success or failure). Similar 
to Weiner’s focus is Grant and Dweck’s (2003) 
work suggesting that whether one explains dif-
fi cult experiences in the classroom in terms of 
an entity or incremental framework determines 
whether one is devastated or energized by such 
diffi culties. Furthermore, a large body of work 
has grown up around the fi nding that depressive 
emotions are rooted in particular styles of 
causal explanation (e.g. Buchanan & Seligman, 
1995). Finally, emotional reactions to illness 
also appear to be rooted in how one explains 
the illness (see Michela and Wood, 1986, for a 
review). The present work thus unites work on 
intergroup emotion with work on emotion in 
other domains by showing that, across these 
diverse areas, emotional experience has a com-
mon foundation in the types of explanatory 
frameworks employed by individuals striving 
to understand their worlds. 
Notes
1. We share Gilbert’s (1998; see also L. Ross, 1977) 
interpretation of external causation. Strictly 
speaking, external forces cannot directly cause 
behavior. Yet, people often point to external 
forces when they explain behavior: ‘He had 
a rough childhood’. We agree with Gilbert 
that what these external explanations mean is 
this: ‘His characteristics are the characteristics 
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that anyone would have if subjected to the same 
experiences’. That is, his thoughts, feelings, 
and behaviors can be understood as natural and 
predictable human responses to the experience of 
having a rough childhood. 
2. Of course, there are other dimensions along 
which explanations can vary. For example, 
Weiner (1986) offered the dimensions 
of stable vs. unstable and controllable vs. 
uncontrollable. Dweck (1999) offered the 
notion that explanations can refer to malleable 
(incremental theory) or fi xed (entity theory) 
features of an actor. Malle (2004) offered the 
idea that explanations tend to characterize 
behaviors as unintentional or intentional, and, 
for behaviors characterized as intentional, 
explanations involve characterizing the actor’s 
reasons or the causal history of those reasons. 
Despite this conceptual diversity, the application 
of these frameworks to issues of intergroup 
cognition and emotion is in its infancy (but see 
Levy, Stroessner, & Dweck, 1998; O’Laughlin & 
Malle, 2002). Because existing evidence pertains 
primarily to the roles of internal and external 
frameworks in the intergroup context (e.g. 
Guimond et al., 1989; Hewstone, 1990; Kluegel 
& Bobo, 1993; Lopez et al., 1998; Pettigrew, 
1979; Taylor & Jaggi, 1974), the present analysis 
will focus on those. Future research, however, 
is clearly needed to explore the relevance of 
the entire gamut of explanatory frameworks for 
intergroup cognition and emotion. 
3. For some analyses, degrees of freedom are lower 
than would be expected based on the number 
of participants in our study. This stems from 
missing data. For example, for the present 
regression model, data from four participants 
could not be used. Two of these participants 
failed to complete the compunction items, one 
failed to complete the internal explanations 
items, and one failed to complete the EMS 
items. 
4. The IMS by discrepancies interaction is 
signifi cant only when controlling for all 
these other predictors. Thus, examining the 
IMS by discrepancies interaction using ‘raw’ 
compunction scores, i.e. without calculating 
these residual scores, reveals a pattern that is 
clearly not a statistical interaction. 
5. As noted by a reviewer, this cannot be taken as 
evidence for racial bias per se because similar 
levels of discrimination might be observed if 
the scenario referred to White teenagers in a 
bad neighborhood. We do not mean to imply 
otherwise. Nevertheless, our analyses suggest 
there is a racial component to this scenario 
because people’s emotional and cognitive 
reactions to discriminating are quite predictable 
from their social explanations regarding African 
Americans. 
6. Notably, in both cases the mediation effect 
represents partial rather than full mediation, as 
indicated by the fact that the relation between 
external explanations and compunction 
remained signifi cant when either mediator was 
added to the multiple regression model. We 
suspect that an even stronger mediating role of 
justice concerns would have emerged had we 
created a better, multi-item measure of that con-
struct. Future research is needed to examine this 
claim. 
7. This consisted of seven items rated on a scale 
ranging from Strongly disagree (1) to Strongly 
agree (6). The items were: ‘People could learn a 
lot about social justice and philosophies of social 
change if they would read the works of great 
African American social leaders such as Martin 
Luther King, Jr., W.E.B. DuBois, and others’; 
‘African Americans have made impressive 
contributions to our collective culture with 
their creation of blues and jazz musical styles’; 
‘I admire the work of great African American 
writers such as Toni Morrison, Richard Wright, 
Ralph Ellison, James Baldwin, Nora Zeale 
Hurston, and others’; ‘I think that the cultural 
contributions of African Americans are inferior 
to those of European Americans’; ‘Because 
African Americans have suffered so much social 
discrimination, I think the study of their culture 
could teach us valuable lessons about how to 
cope with adversity’; ‘Overall, I think there is 
much value in African American culture’; and 
‘Nothing important would be learned from 
studying African American culture’. 
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Appendix A
Social Explanations Questionnaire
NOTES: 
• ‘EXT’ indicates items composing the external 
explanations scale.
• ‘INT’ indicates items composing the internal 
explanations scale.
• There are twice as many internal as external 
items. The reason is that six of the internal items 
were intended to tap biological essentialism 
(Keller, 2005; items 5, 6, 11, 12, 17, 18) whereas 
the other six internal items were intended to tap 
internal explanations with no particular biological 
implication (items 3, 4, 9, 10, 15, 16). These two 
sets of items behave identically in all analyses and 
so were simply averaged together. 
EXT (1) The history of slavery, segregation, and dis-
crimination suffered by African Americans 
has surely contributed to any current 
economic and social problems they are 
facing. 
EXT (2) Ultimately, any social or economic problems 
of the African American community are 
rooted in the profound mistreatment 
they have been subjected to in the United 
States. 
INT (3) African Americans are generally less well-off 
than are White Americans because they do 
not try as hard as White Americans. 
INT (4) African Americans simply have different 
attitudes and values from White Americans 
and thus they will never fit in and be 
successful in the United States. 
INT (5) African Americans are genetically inferior 
to White Americans, and I think this plays 
a role in African Americans’ relatively low 
social and economic status. 
INT (6) African Americans and White Americans 
evolved biologically under different 
circumstances and this has resulted 
in different levels of intelligence and 
ambition.
EXT (7) When I think about the history of African 
Americans in the United States, it is easy to 
understand why some of them feel angry 
or resentful; I would feel the same way. 
EXT (8) The reason that African Americans are 
sometimes less likely to go to college 
than are White Americans is that African 
American schools in many neighborhoods 
are underfunded and inadequate.
INT (9) African Americans have fewer job oppor-
tunities because they are so hard to get 
along with; they are often argumentative 
and have attitude problems.
INT (10) The values of individual responsibility and 
hard work seem incompatible with African 
American culture and this does not bode 
well for their future. 
INT (11) Sometimes I think that the reason many 
African Americans have poor educational 
outcomes is that they are just not a very 
intelligent group.
INT (12) It should come as no surprise that African 
Americans and White Americans do not 
have the same outcomes socially and 
economically: they are different races 
and different races have different inborn 
abilities. 
EXT (13) Poverty is like a trap that is very diffi cult 
to escape; this is an important reason why 
African Americans continue to linger 
behind White Americans economically. 
EXT (14) I imagine that the constant barrage of 
stereotypes and prejudice in the US is 
disheartening and debilitating for African 
Americans. 
INT (15) African Americans have developed a culture 
of disrespecting themselves and others; they 
need to change this in order to improve 
their status in the United States. 
INT (16) As soon as African Americans manage to 
get their culture focused on more positive 
values such as hard work and self-discipline, 
their social position will improve. 
INT (17) African Americans are just naturally prone 
to violence; people who point to poverty 
and discrimination as causes of this violence 
are only making excuses. 
INT (18) Biologically speaking, African Americans 
appear to be inherently better suited for 
physical rather than intellectual pursuits. 
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Appendix B
Social Reactions Questionnaire
Imagine that you are alone, walking down a dark, 
urban street in the middle of the night. You are 
entering a dangerous, high-crime area. As you 
make your way down the street, you spot a group 
of African American male teenagers hanging out 
on the street corner. How likely would you be to 
engage in some behavior to avoid or keep your 
distance from the group? 
Check ONE:
___I would defi nitely NOT try to avoid or keep my 
distance.
___I might try to avoid or keep my distance. 
For participants who checked the lower box, the following 
items were presented: 
Compunction items:
 I feel a little guilty at the thought that I would 
avoid them
 I am ashamed at the thought that I would 
discriminate
Emotional distress items: 
 It makes me sad that I feel I need to avoid certain 
people
 I am not bothered by imagining myself doing 
this
 I am distressed
Justice item: 
 I worry that I might be unfair in avoiding or keeping 
my distance
 
Rationality items:
 I think I’m only being sensible
 I think I’m just being rational
 I cannot give people the benefi t of the doubt if 
there is potential danger
 It’s not my fault that I need to avoid such 
teenagers 
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